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Custy: The Second Injury Fund: Encouraging Employment of the Handicapped

THE SECOND INJURY FUND:
ENCOURAGING EMPLOYMENT OF THE
HANDICAPPED WORKER IN SOUTH
CAROLINA
ARTHUR
I.

B. CUSTY*

INTRODUCTION'

A, a onehanded worker, loses his remaining hand in a job
accident. B, A's employer, argues that his liability should be
limited to compensation only for the hand that was lost in his
employment. A claims, however, that he has become permanently and totally disabled while working for B and compensation
for anything less than permanent total disability would force him
and his family to seek charity.'
For many years there were only two accepted solutions to the
dilemma described above, one created by the judiciary and the
other through legislative action. Several courts had adopted what
became known as the "full responsibility rule," imposing liability
for the entire disability upon the employer,3 regardless of actual
responsibility on the employer's part as to the extent of the disability. In those states following the rule it was not long before
employers were thinking twice before hiring handicapped workers.' Many states, in an apparent effort to reduce the impact of
* Professor of Law, The University of South Carolina School of Law. A.B., J.D.,
University of Mississippi; J.S.D., Yale University.
1. The author would like to express his gratitude to Michael A. Zimmerman for
contributing his research, writing and editing talents to this article. Mr. Zimmerman
graduated in May 1973 and is now a member of the New York Bar. The author wishes
also to thank Mr. Howard Victry, Director of the South Carolina Second Injury Fund, for
his assistance in providing information about South Carolina's Second Injury Fund.
2. This was the problem in Schwab v. Emporium Forestry Co., 216 N.Y. 712, 153
N.Y.S. 234, afl'd, 111 N.E. 1099 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1915). The court held that upon the loss
of his second hand, the employee was permanently totally disabled and that the employer
was liable for the entire disability. The holding in Schwab was one of the factors that
prompted the New York Legislature in 1916 to adopt the first Second Injury Fund in the
United States.
3. 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 59.10 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
A. LARSON].
4. Although the South Carolina Supreme Court did not adopt the "full responsibility
rule" by name, it did lay the groundwork for the inception of the rule. In Cole v. State
Highway Department, 190 S.C. 142, 2 S.E.2d 490 (1939), the court relied upon a California
case and a treatise in holding that although an injury aggravates a preexisting condition
or disease so that a disability is more extensive than that which would result from the
injury alone, the increased disability is still compensable. Although it would have been
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the "full responsibility rule," passed apportionment statutes
which limited the employer's liability to the injury that occurred
while the handicapped worker was in his employment. 5 This
swing of the pendulum in the opposite direction, however, created
even greater problems as the legislators limited the handicapped
worker's recovery to such an extent that compensation awards
tended to be grossly inadequate in light of the permanency of the
injury and the probable inability to obtain significant future
employment. The need for an alternative approach arose when it
became painfully clear that both of the traditional solutions to
the subsequent injury dilemma were operating against handicapped workers. With the "full responsibility rule" in force, employers were quite hesitant to hire handicapped workers, and in
some cases fired those handicapped workers already employed.'
Applications of apportionment statutes,7 on the other hand, were
driving the handicapped into uncompensated poverty.
Finding the handicapped workers' position intolerable, the
majority of the states have created funds designed to compensate
such workers fully in subsequent injury situations without penalizing the employers for hiring them in the first place.' South
Carolina subscribed to this policy in establishing the Second
Injury Fund, effective July 1, 1972,1 and modified its apportionment statutes to include the Fund in the chain of liability.'" Following 3 years of amendments the question must now be
raised-does the Fund actually serve the purpose for which it was
designed, or is it merely another bureaucratic snarl of red tape
giving rise to false hopes and promises?
II.

THE PROBLEM AND THE POLICY

Throughout the analysis of the Second Injury Fund it must
an easy step from the Cole ruling to the "full responsibility rule," the progression was
halted abruptly by the passage of South Carolina's apportionment statute. See note 5
infra.
5. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 59.10. South Carolina's apportionment statute
was typical of such legislation. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 72-166 to 168 (1962).
6. Professor Larson cites as an example the situation in Oklahoma where within 30
days following the adoption of a nonapportionment rule, between 7,000 and 8,000 handicapped men were fired. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 59.31.
7. For a discussion of the many problems involved in the application of apportionment statutes see 2 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 59.20.
8. Current research indicates that only two states, Georgia and Virginia, do not
furnish some type of subsequent injury protection to physically handicapped workers.
9. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 72-601 to -602 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
10. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 72-166 to -168 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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be kept in mind that the driving force behind the implementation
of any subsequent injury fund is the desire to eliminate what has
become a significant obstacle to employment of handicapped
workers-the employer's fear of increased compensation costs
should the employee suffer a subsequent injury.' While desiring
to compensate injured employees fully for injuries incurred on the
job, employers are not particularly anxious to absorb the costs of
permanent disabilities created by unrelated compound injuries.
The Second Injury Fund is designed to allay such fears by subjecting the employer to liability only for the amount of disability
directly attributable to the particular injury occurring while the
handicapped worker is in his employ, while, at the same time,
compensating the handicapped worker for the full effect of his
subsequent injury. It is the Fund that makes up the difference in
compensatory value of the subsequent injury
alone and that of
2
the combined injuries, not the employer. ,
The desired effect of the apportionment of liability between
the employer and the Second Injury Fund is twofold. The employer must be guaranteed that he will be compensated for any
economic disadvantage he might sustain as a result of hiring
handicapped workers in a "full responsibility rule" jurisdiction.
Additionally, the handicapped employee must be fully protected,
receiving the same compensation he would have been entitled to
had the employer been held liable for the entire disability.
III.

SCOPE AND OPERATION OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA SECOND INJURY

FUND

A.

Prerequisitesto Reimbursement

The original draft of the South Carolina Second Injury
Fund 3 was primarily taken from model legislation proposed by
11. See N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW § 15(8)(a) (McKinney 1965), which states that
the purpose of New York's Second Injury Fund statute is:
First: That every person in this state who works for a living is entitled to a
reasonable opportunity to maintain his independence and self respect through
self support even after he has been physically handicapped by injury or disease;
Second: That any plan which will reasonably, equitably and practically break
down hindrances and remove obstacles to the employment of partially disabled
persons . . . is of vital importance to the state and its people and is of concern
to this legislature; . ...
12. L. LARSON, THE RoLE OF SUBSEQUENT INJURY FUNDS IN ENCOURAGING
OF HANDICAPPED WORKERS 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as L. LARSON].
13. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 72-601 to -602 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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the Council of State Governments, 4 incorporating provisions
from various state statutes. The Fund most closely follows subsequent injury legislation passed by the New York Legislature, especially in the aspect that an employer in South Carolina must
fully compensate the injured handicapped worker in the first instance, and then prove that his case falls within the purview of
the Fund to obtain reimbursement for additional amounts paid
to compensate for the combined effects of the unrelated injuries.15
In requiring the employer to compensate the employee fully at the
outset and then placing the burden on the employer to seek reimbursement, the Legislature has ensured that the injured employee will receive his full benefits as soon as possible after the
injury when compensation is most needed."6 It is then up to the
employer to demonstrate that he fulfills statutory requirements
which place him within the scope of the Fund and make him
eligible for reimbursement. It is important for the employer to
realize that the Second Injury Fund is his remedy, not the employee's, therefore the employer has the burden of proof.' 7
1.

PriorPermanentPhysical Impairment

If an employee who has a permanent physical impairmentfrom
any cause or origin ....
The first step towards reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund requires a showing that, prior to employment or reemployment by the employer seeking reimbursement, the employee
had a "permanent physical impairment."1 8 The meaning given
this term is crucial, since the number of handicapped workers
deriving benefits from the Fund will vary according to the
breadth given the interpretation of what actually constitutes a
"permanent physical impairment." Keeping in mind the Fund's
limited resources 9 and the purposes for which it was created," it
is imperative that some restrictions be placed upon the class of
employees falling within the coverage of the Fund. The determi14.

COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION: WORKMEN'S COM-

PENSATION AND REHABILITATION LAW

163 (1963).

15. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 72-601(a) & (b) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
16. This procedure may also affect the running of the statute of limitations. See 2 A.
LARSON, supra note 3, § 59.31.
17. This is not true in California. See note 59 infra.
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-601(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975).

19. See discussion of financial support in text accompanying notes 82-89 infra.
20. See note 11 supra.
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nation of exactly what restrictions are necessary has proved to be
a difficult task, however, with the result that some courts and
legislatures have unduly restricted the class of prior handicaps
considered by the Fund's administrators.
The dominant trend in subsequent injury fund legislation
has been to limit coverage to prior injuries that take the form of
the loss or loss of use of a member or of an eye.2 ' South Carolina's
Second Injury Fund was initially restricted in this manner,"2 but
the realization was not long in coming that such a narrow scope
failed to protect the majority of the handicapped workers and
their employers. Only a small percentage of all permanently disabled individuals were amputees or people with serious visual impairments. 3 The courts adhered to a narrow statutory interpretation, however, as reflected in Bannisterv. State Workmen's Com24
pensation Commissioner.
The West Virginia Supreme Court
found that, under its state statute covering claimants having an
impairment "caused by a previous injury,"2 the Second Injury
Fund did not apply to employees with silicosis, asthma or emphysema because such diseases were not proximately caused by their
employment. If one recalls that the primary purpose of subsequent injury fund legislation is the elimination of unemployment
among the handicapped by the removal of competitive disadvantages, there is little or no reason for a legislature or a court to
make employment more available to one designated class of
handicapped workers, while denying employment to others of
equal need. 21 In an age of nondiscrimination, such absolute discrimination appears totally unjustified. Professor Larson points
out the ironic effect that such restrictive interpretations may
have on the entire compensatory scheme:
If a man has a prior history of cardiac disease, ruptured intervertebral disc, or tuberculosis, since under many existing decisions
21. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 59.32.
22. No. 610, § 40, [1936] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1251.
23. L. LARSON, supra note 12, at 4.
24. 154 W. Va. 172, 174 S.E.2d 605 (1970).
25. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-3-1 (1973).
26. The United States Supreme Court in Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & Steamship
Co., 336 U.S. 198 (1949), held that the Second Injury Fund provisions in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 908(f)(1) (1970), were applicable to an injured employee irrespective of whether the previous disability resulted from
an injury caused by an accident in industry or by a cause outside of industry. The Court
stated that one would not expect Congress to distinguish between two types of handicapped workers.
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an employer might be liable for the full consequences of aggravation of this preexisting condition, the hindrance to hiring such
persons may be even greater than in the case of amputations.2
Following several amendments, the South Carolina Second
Injury Fund now provides coverage for a large class of handicaps
which qualify as a "permanent physical impairment." The class
is identified in a general as well as a specific manner. Generally,
a "permanent physical impairment" includes
any permanent condition, whether congenital or due to injury
or disease, of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or
obstacle to obtaining employment or to obtaining reemployment if the employee should become unemployed.23
This definition follows the New York approach 29 to identifying
those handicaps which fall into the class of "permanent physical
impairment," a concept designed to afford optimum flexibility in
application of Fund resources. The definition, standing alone,
permits a body of experts administering the Fund to determine,
on a case by case basis, exactly what conditions constitute a prior
handicap, thus allowing the Fund to adjust itself to new diseases
and employment environments. Although flexibility is almost
always a statutory attribute, the uncertainty that the New York
approach might create could outweigh its inherent advantages as
well as defeat the whole purpose of the Second Injury Fund. If an
agency is the sole body charged with the identification of those
prior handicaps falling within the scope of the Fund on a case by
case basis, the determination would always be after-the-fact,
thereby giving employers no guarantee that they will be compensated for any risks taken in hiring a worker with a particular
handicap. In order to provide the South Carolina employer with
some security, the Legislature has established, in addition to the
general definition, a list of particular impairments that will qualify as a "physical impairment" within the scope of the Second
Injury Fund.30 Each item on this list carries with it a presumption
27. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 59.32 at 10-303.
28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-601(d) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
29. N.Y. WORKMEN'S CoMP. LAW § 15(8)(b) (McKinney 1965) states: "'[Permanent physical impairment' means any permanent condition due to previous accident or
disease or any congenital condition which is or is likely to be a hindrance or obstacle to
employment." See also ORE. REv. STAT. § 656.638 (1967); MINN. STAT. § 176.131(8) (1966).
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-601(d) (Cum. Supp. 1975). This list includes:
(1) Epilepsy
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that the impairment is permanent, and that it is a hindrance or
obstacle to employment, provided that the employer establishes
that he knew of the handicap prior to hiring the employee." This
enumeration of "permanent physical impairments" gives the
employer the necessary assurance that his liability will be limited
if he chooses to hire a worker suffering from one of the listed
impairments. The Fund does, however, encourage employers to
hire other handicapped workers whose impairments are not
listed. Following the laundry list of ailments and injuries, the
Legislature has added a provision which includes in the classification "permanent physical impairment":
(2) Diabetes
(3) Cardiac disease
(4) Arthritis
(5) Amputated foot, leg, arm or hand
(6) Loss of sight of one or both eyes or a partial loss of uncorrected vision of more
than seventy-five percent bilateral
(7) Residual disability from poliomyelitis
(8) Cerebral palsy
(9) Multiple sclerosis
(10) Parkinson's disease
(11) Cerebral vascular accident
(12) Tuberculosis
(13) Silicosis
(14) Psychoneurotic disability following treatment in a recognized medical or
mental institution
(15) Hemophilia
(16) Chronic osteomyelitis
(17) Ankylosis of joints
(18) Hyperinsulinism
(19) Muscular dystrophy
(20) Arteriosclerosis
(21) Thrombophlebitis
(22) Varicose veins
(23) Heavy metal poisoning
(24) Ionizing radiation injury
(25) Compressed air sequelae
(26) Ruptured intervertebral disc
(27) Hodgkin's disease
(28) Brain damage
(29) Deafness
(30) Mental retardation provided the employee's intelligence quotient is such
that he falls within the lowest percentile of the general population. However, it
shall not be necessary for the employer to know the employee's actual intelligence quotient or actual relative ranking in relation to the intelligence quotient
of the general population.
31. A different approach is taken in the proposed DIsABLED VEraANs EMPLOYMENT
AcT, H.R. 1448, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), where a permanent physical impairment is
broadly defined, but the list of conditions that constitute such an impairment are merely
entitled to a rebuttable presumption that they come within the scope of the Act.
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Any other preexisting disease, condition or impairment which is
permanent in nature and which:
(a) would qualify for payment of weekly disability benefits of seventy-eight weeks or more under [the Workmen's Compensation schedule] exclusive of benefits payable for disfigurement or
(b) would support a rating of seventy-eight or more weeks
of weekly disability benefits. . . or combines with a subsequent
injury to cause a permanent impairment rated at seventyeight weeks or more .... 11
This provision will aid in further identifying those impairments
which may arise pursuant to developments in industrial technology and changes in the environment, and gives the South Carolina Second Injury Fund flexibility as well as certainty.
A word of caution is in order to those employers seeking to
establish prior impairments under the Fund. While the enumerated impairments are given a presumption of permanency, the
burden is on the employer in all other cases to prove that the prior
handicap was permanent at the time of employment and that the
employer knew that it was permanent.3 3 A temporary condition
will not qualify for reimbursement for the simple reason that the
employer was not really taking a risk that would call for reimbursement. Therefore, the administrators of the Fund cannot be
expected to be sympathetic.
2.

Subsequent OccupationalInjury

incurs a subsequent disability from injury by accident ....
The second step to reimbursement from the Fund requires
the employer to demonstrate that his compensation and medical
liability for the subsequent injury is significantly increased by the
employee's preexisting permanent physical handicap. The
Fund's enacting legislation provides that the accident arising out
of the employment relationship must result in
liability . . . for disability that is substantially greater, by
reason of the combined effects of the preexisting impairment,
than that which would have resulted from the subsequent injury
alone .

.

. .Y

32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-601(d)(31) (Cum. Supp. 1975). The schedule for compensation is set out at S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-153 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
33. For a discussion of employer's knowledge see text accompanying notes 51-67 infra.
34. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-601(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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The most important words here, for the employer, are "substantially greater" and "combined effects." The "substantially
greater" standard of measurement 5 implemented by the South
Carolina Legislature is designed to provide a broad basis of protection for the handicapped worker. In contrast, approximately
30 states limit the application of their subsequent injury funds to
those situations in which the prior and subsequent injuries result
in permanent total disability.36 Such limitations have greatly reduced the effectiveness of subsequent injury funds when coupled
with the fact that less than one-tenth of all occupational accidents result in permanent total disability." There appears to be
no justification for precluding recovery from the Fund on the
basis of the extent of the ensuing disability. The extent of the
resulting disability is irrelevant to the purpose of the Fund and
any attempt to limit employers' reimbursement to permanent
total disability cases serves only to impede that purpose. The
South Carolina Legislature has apparently recognized this defect
and cured it by adopting the "substantially greater" standard. 8
Even that liberal standard has an escape clause, however, for the
employer who can show that, "but for" the employee's prior permanent physical impairment, the subsequent injury "most probably would not have occurred."" Again the Legislature has encouraged the hiring of the handicapped by removing the risk of
increased liability for an employer when the handicap itself
causes a subsequent injury, but the ensuing disability fails to
satisfy the "substantially greater" test.
The fact remains that the South Carolina Supreme Court has
yet to interpret any of the language of the Second Injury Fund
legislation, and there are some serious pitfalls that may confront
the employer seeking reimbursement from the Fund. Case law
from other jurisdictions indicates that employers may have to
35. The "substantially greater" standard was taken from the Council of State Governments suggested State Workmen's Compensation and Rehabilitation Law. See note 14
supra.
36. L. LARSON, supra note 12, at 4. But see MINN. STAT. § 176.131(8) (1966), where
the disability that results in substantially greater liability is defined as "any condition
causing either temporary total, temporary partial, permanent total, permanent partial,
death, medical expense, or retraining."
37. L. LARSON, supra note 12, at 5.
38. It remains to be seen what interpretation the South Carolina Supreme Court will
give the language calling for a "substantially greater" liability, but, based upon the small
percentage of permanent total disabilities, the court is likely to give the language a
meaning. consistent with the liberal philosophy of the Second Injury Fund.
39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-601(g) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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wait awhile before it is known exactly what sort of "combined
effects" will give rise to "substantially greater" disability. In light
of the fact that the "substantially greater" standard has been the
minority rule, South Carolina will most likely have to set its own
monetary threshold for establishing "substantially greater" liability. The interpretation given the language "combined effects,"
however, may be quite troublesome and can represent a fatal trap
to the unwary employer or attorney. Two problems must be considered in interpreting this language: the nature of the causal
relationship between the prior impairment and the subsequent
injury, and the relationship of each to the final disability. It
appears to be well established in other jurisdictions that it is not
necessary to show any special relationship between the injuries,
so long as the existence of the former injury substantially augments the disability ensuing from the latter."
In Davis v. CongerLife Insurance Co.,41 the claimant suffered
a compensable back injury which could not be surgically corrected due to a heart condition, and the injury resulted in total
disability. The Florida Supreme Court held that even though the
injuries were not physically related, a merger of successive disabilities had taken place and the claimant was entitled to an
award for total disability, part being paid by the Special Disability Fund. A New York court in Torelli v. Robert Hall Clothes,42
held that the Fund was not liable when the prior injury was
partial deafness and the ultimate disability took the form of an
injured hand; the prior injury was found not to be of such a degree
as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to employment. Furthermore, where there was a lack of substantial evidence that a permanent disability resulting from prior obesity and a subsequently
herniated disc was materially and substantially greater than
would have been suffered from the herniated disc alone, the Fund
was not held to be liable.43
These cases illustrate that the inquiry should not be whether
the prior injury caused or in some way combined with the second,
but merely whether or not the prior injury in some way
contributed to the final result. Even though the subsequent injury would have occurred without the existence of the prior one,
if the prior injury causes the degree of disability resulting from
40.
41.
42.
43.
(1973).

2 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 59.32.
201 So. 2d 727 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1967).
9 App. Div. 2d 147, 194 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1959).
Shirley v. Triangle Maintenance Corp., 41 App. Div. 2d 800, 341 N.Y.S.2d 709
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the latter injury to be materially greater, the Fund should be
liable for that excess amount, since it is at that point that the
combined effects result in substantially greater disability.
The circumstances which will frequently thwart reimbursement from the Fund are those in which either the prior impairment or the subsequent injury are totally responsible for causing
the increased disability. The Fund will probably not be liable if
the prior impairment contributed nothing to the final disability,44
or if the subsequent injuries were so severe that they alone caused
the disability. 5 This situation in reverse will also preclude recovery. If the preexisting impairment is the overwhelming cause of
the disability, the Fund will not be liable, since there is no tie-in
with a compensable injury.46
Employers must also be aware that the subsequent injury
must be a compensable injury under the workmen's compensation statutes to qualify for reimbursement from the Second Injury
Fund. Although one jurisdiction has held that the Fund is liable
when the compensable injury came first and the noncompensable
injury followed," there appears to be little doubt that the second
injury must be compensable before reimbursement can be considered.4"
It is important to note that South Carolina's Second Injury
Fund also extends to situations in which the subsequent injury
results in the death of a handicapped employee. The Fund will
reimburse the employer when it is "determined that the death
would not have occurred except for such preexisting permanent
physical impairment. . . ,,
1 The protection offered by this provision is significant in light of the number of handicapped individuals possessing a history of cardiac disease, or some other
degenerative diseases. The employer faced with the question of
employing a man who is qualified in all respects, except for a
previous heart condition, may feel that he is taking a special risk,
for a subsequent injury may be fatal. The death provision pro44. 2 A.

LARSON,

supra note 3, § 59.32.

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Bianco v. Genco Tool & Gauge Co., 6 Mich. App. 590,149 N.W.2d 905 (1967).
Professor Larson described the holding in Bianco as "a strange concatenation of a second
injury statute and an amendment updating benefits" through which "a Subsequent Injury
Fund was indeed transmuted into a Prior Injury Fund." 2 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 59.32
n.92.
48. 2 A. LARsON, supra note 3, § 59.32.
49. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-601(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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vides the employer with an escape clause similar to that covering
the "but for" subsequent injuries discussed previously, 0 thus encouraging the employer to hire the employee despite his heart
condition. Some problems may arise distinguishing between the
preexisting condition and the final fact of death, but legislation
designed to encourage the employment of the handicapped cannot merely disregard the factor of death in the compensatory
scheme.
3.

Employer's PriorKnowledge of the Handicap

the employer must establish . . . knowledge of the permanent
physical impairment at the time that the employee was
hired ....
The item of proof that cuts to the very heart of Second Injury
Fund policy is the final prerequisite for recovery-the employer's
knowledge. If the employer does not know an employee is handicapped when he is hired, the employer is not taking any risk for
which he should be compensated from the Second Injury Fund.
The commentary to the Council of State Governments Model Act
states:
[I]f the purpose of the . . . [Second Injury Fund] principle is
to prevent discrimination in the hiring of handicapped workers,
it follows that the problem arises only when the employer knows
of the preexisting impairment. He is not going to discriminate
on the basis of something he does not know. However, the existence of such knowledge cannot be left to later wrangling about
the state of the employer's knowledge evidenced only by conflicting assertions.5 '
Professor Larson has summarized the multitude of problems involved in determining the employer's intent 2 and South Carolina
could have easily been thrust into the controversy. The Legislature has chosen instead to follow the suggestions of the Model
Act" and require that
[i]n order to qualify under this section for reimbursement from
the Second Injury Fund, the employer must establish by written
50. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
51.

COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 137

(1965).

52. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 59.33.
53.

COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION: WORKMEN'S COM-

PENSATION

& REHABILITATION LAW § 20(c) (1965).
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records which shall be filed with the Commission and the fund,
when claim is made for reimbursement thereunder, that the
employer had knowledge of the permanent physical impairment
at the time that the employee was hired, or at the time that the
employee was retained 5 4in employment after the employer acquired such knowledge.
The present South Carolina definition of a "permanent physical
impairment" 55 is sufficiently broad and complex that when an
employer hires an individual he may never realize that the new
employee has silicosis, epilepsy, diabetes or any other condition
defined as a permanent impairment. This being the case, should
the handicapped worker suffer subsequent injury, the employer
will now try to shift some of his liability to the Second Injury
Fund, even though he never had any intention of hiring a handicapped individual in the first instance. To prevent this divergence of fund resources, the requirement that the employer establish written records at the time of employment, or at the time the
employee was retained after the employer acquired such knowledge, will better serve the original justification of the Second
Injury Fund principle.
The most extensive controversy in this area focuses on
whether an employer must have actual knowledge of the preexisting impairment before he may be reimbursed by the subsequent
injury fund. The South Carolina requirement for written records
would appear to force compliance with the New York rule which
states that the primary purpose of the Second Injury Fund, promoting the hiring of the handicapped, requires actual knowledge
on the part of the employer. California courts, however, in interpreting the California Subsequent Injuries Fund,5 refuse to require the employer to have actual knowledge of the employee's
preexisting impairment.
In Subsequent Injuries Fund v. Industrial Accident
Commission,5" a partially deaf individual was involved in an accident resulting in a more serious loss of hearing. Following the
accident, he applied to the Subsequent Injuries Fund for benefits.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
dustrial
Injuries

S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-601(c) (Cum. Supp. 1975) (emphasis added).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-601(d) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
2 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 59.33.
CAL. LABOR CODE ANN. §§ 4750-51 (West 1971).
56 Cal. 2d 842, 366 P.2d 496, 17 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1961); accord, Ferguson v. InAccident Comm'n, 50 Cal. 2d 469, 326 P.2d 145 (1958); cf. State Subsequent
Fund v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 135 Cal. App. 2d 544, 288 P.2d 31 (1955).
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Even though the employer hired the worker without any knowledge of his deafness, the court stated that there is no reason why
the preexisting disability should be known to the employer before
an injured employee can receive benefits from the Fund. The
court held that the sole requirement was attaining the status of
"permanently partially disabled" prior to the occurrence. Although this decision appears to be granting the employer a windfall by relieving him of partial liability, there are certain considerations which favor the California approach. If one assumes the
exclusive purpose of the Second Injury Fund to be to encourage
employment of the handicapped worker, then the actual notice
requirement is defensible. If, however, the intent of the Fund is
also to spread the risks associated with the prior handicap in such
a way that the entire burden is not imposed upon the employee
or the employer, the requirement becomes counterproductive. An
equitable result cannot be achieved by requiring the employer to
bear the burden of the liability unrelated to his employment
merely because the employee concealed, or the employer did not
inquire about, preexisting impairments. The effect of noncompliance with the actual knowledge requirement encourages the employer to put a premium on limiting his liability in any way
possible, thereby resulting in inadequate compensation, and possible discharge for disabled workers. Additionally, any advance
registration of the handicapped may discourage employers from
employing disabled workers due to the paperwork and expense
involved in ascertaining the extent of the employee's disability. 9
South Carolina has chosen to follow both the New York and
the California rules to some extent. The written record requirement forces the employer to establish at the outset some file or
other record of an employee's physical characteristics if the
employer desires any assurance that he will be reimbursed should
the employee suffer subsequent injuries. It has not been established just what type of record this must be, medical records,
59. One reason that the courts in California have not required employers to have prior
knowledge of the employee's handicap may be due to their method of administering the
Fund. In South Carolina, as in New York, the employer pays all benefits to the employee
and then seeks his reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund. In California, however,
the employee seeks compensation directly from the Subsequent Injuries Fund. As a result,
California courts might have found it difficult to reconcile why the claimant employee's
rights to compensation should depend upon what the employer knew and when he knew
it, particularly if the employer was out of the case. See 2 A. LARSON, supranote 3, § 59.33.
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personnel records or interviews, but under the New York rule
such records should demonstrate:
(1) that the employer believed the condition was permanent 0
or was one of the enumerated impairments;6'
(2) that the condition of which the employer had 6knowledge
2
was the condition that figured in the final disability;
(3) that the employer knew that the condition was likely to be
a hindrance to employment;"
(4) that the employer's knowledge is based upon more than
"vague or indirect intimations."64
Under the actual knowledge provision, South Carolina employers
will be forced to become more familiar with the Second Injury
Fund concept. In attempting to avoid after-the-fact discovery of
handicaps, employers may eventually develop the practice of
submitting prospective employees to routine medical examinations. Such an examination, by uncovering the exact extent of the
handicap, will not only put the employer on notice, but will also
provide an adequate written record of the employer's knowledge.
Identification of the handicap will in turn lead to better and more
informed placement of the handicapped worker into a position
more suited to his actual or potential limitations. As a result of
such efforts, the impaired worker will have less reason or ability
to conceal his handicap.
The South Carolina Legislature has gone one step further
than the New York rule in allowing reimbursement of an employer without actual knowledge of a preexisting physical impairment if "such condition was concealed by the employee or was
unknown to the employee."65 Such a provision actually flies in the
face of the New York rule which assumes that the sole purpose
of the Subsequent Injury Fund is to encourage the employment
of the handicapped. The provision more closely resembles the
60. See Dubrow v. 40 West 33rd Street Realty Corp., 4 App. Div. 2d 896, 167 N.Y.S.2d
98 (1957).
61. See note 30 supra.
62. See Jamieson v. Passarelli, 15 App. Div. 2d 854, 224 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1962).

63. See Ryan v. Armour & Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 559, 206 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1960);
Charbonneau v. Alco Prods., Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 813, 192 N.Y.S.2d 684 (1959).
64. See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 59.33 nn. 15-20, citing Stophibeen v.
G.E. Van Vorst Co., 280 App. Div. 1004, 116 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1952) (change to lighter work
because of feebleness); Stein v. La Marguise Footwear, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 552, 189
N.Y.S.2d 520 (1959), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 1081, 170 N.E.2d 456, 207 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1960)
(preexisting condition subject of prior compensation award).
65. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-601(c) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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California interpretation, although it is based upon a different
procedure." It would appear that the South Carolina legislators
are somewhat more concerned with risk-spreading than the New
York courts and are not content merely to encourage the hiring
67
of the handicapped at the expense of the industrial community.
Employers should be cautioned, however, not to depend upon this
escape clause to qualify them for reimbursement. Administrators
of the Fund are likely to accept proof of concealment or lack of
knowledge on the part of the employee only after strict scrutiny.
B.

Distributionof the Liability

Once it is established that the employer qualifies for reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund, the next inquiry is:
How is this increased liability to be allocated between the employer and the Fund? Common sense would respond that the
Fund should be liable for the difference between the compensation payable for the combined injuries, and the compensation
that would have been payable for the second injury alone had it
happened to a healthy individual.6 8 This formula has worked well
where the liability was allocated between loss of vision in one eye
and total blindness;69 or loss of one leg and resulting total disability." Administrative problems arise, however, when the formula
is applied to latent or degenerative conditions. For example, how
would an administrative board apportion liability between preexisting diabetes and more degenerative diabetes, or cardiac disease
and resulting death? Many of the conditions that the South Caro66. See note 59 supra.

67. It is also possible that this provision was added following the South Carolina
Supreme Court holding in Cooper v. McDevitt & Street Co., 260 S.C. 463, 196 S.E.2d 833

(1973). Mr. Cooper, in response to a question on a job application, stated falsely that he
had never had back trouble because he knew that he would not be hired if the employer
had knowledge of a previous back injury. Citing cases from other jurisdictions, the court
stated as a general rule that
the following factors must be present before a false statement in an employment
application will bar benefits: (1) The employee must have knowingly and willfully made a false representation as to his physical condition. (2) The employer
must have relied upon the false representation and this reliance must have been
a substantial factor in the hiring. (3) There must have been a causal connection

between the false representation and the injury.
260 S.C. at 468, 196 S.E.2d at 835.
68. See CAL.

(1972);

LABOR CODE ANN.

MD. CODE ANN.

§ 4750 (West 1971); Ky. REv.

STAT. ANN.

§ 342.120(3)

art. 101 § 36(7) (1964).

69. Cabe v. Stamps, 429 S.W.2d 361 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).

70. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Watts, 16 Md. App. 71, 293 A.2d 836 (1972).
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lina statute considers to be preexisting impairments71 tend to be
latent and progressive diseases, situations in which apportioning
compensation benefits between the liability resulting from the
prior condition and the subsequent injury would be extremely
difficult, possibly producing arbitrary and inequitable results.
The South Carolina Legislature has effectively eliminated this
problem by adopting the New York approach, which arbitrarily
limits employers' liability for the compensation and medical benefits to the first 104 weeks, by limiting employers' liability in
South Carolina to the first 78 weeks. 72 The Second Injury Fund
then assumes the liability for all remaining payments that were
awarded to adequately compensate the injured worker. While this
formula furnishes a solution when the allocation of liability is
difficult to ascertain, it may work to the disadvantage of an employer when the proportion can be determined. For example, envision a situation where the subsequent injury alone is a minor
one, resulting in 52 weeks of benefits, but the combined effect
with the preexisting impairment results in total and permanent
disability for the employee. Is the employer liable for the extra
year's compensation and medical payments or does the Fund assume them? It can be argued that when the compensation benefits for the second injury alone exceed 78 weeks, the Fund assumes them, so when they fall below this arbitrary division of
liability, the employer should regard it as his quid pro quo. One
must remember, however, that a major justification for the
Second Injury Fund is the limitation of the employer's liability
to the injury occurring while the handicapped worker was in his
employ. Limiting the employer's liability to the subsequent injury, even if it is below the 78 week division of liability, will better
serve the primary purpose of the Second Injury Fund, increased
employment of the handicapped, as well as reinforcing the greatest asset of the 78 week period-the certainty it gives the employer in ascertaining the limits of his liability. The actual operation of this provision seems to work reasonably well in New York,
and since any rule of distribution in these cases would undoubtedly be equally as arbitrary, considering the difficulties of proof
involved, it is doubtful that a better solution can be implemented.
The South Carolina Second Injury Fund does go one step
71. See note 30 supra.
72. N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW § 15(8)(d) (McKinney 1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 72601.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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further than the Model Act by providing not only for the allocation of the compensation benefits, but also for the medical costs
attendant on the combined injuries.73 This additional feature
takes into consideration the fact that most serious injuries require
prolonged hospitalization and extensive treatment. In some
cases, where a severe preexisting condition is aggravated by a
second injury, the medical expenses may well exceed the employer's compensation costs. In New York the Subsequent Injury
1 and the
Fund also provides for allocation of medical benefits,7
question has arisen whether the medical costs are completely
distinguishable from the compensation costs. If the disability
payments are merely for 28 weeks, can the Second Injury Fund
still be utilized by-employers when their medical costs exceed
the statutory maximum number of weeks? Answering in the af75
firmative, the New York court in Mastrodonato v. PfaudlerCo.
stated that there was no legislative intent to require a claimant
to receive both medical benefits and compensation for 104 weeks
before a carrier or employer qualified for reimbursement for
further payments of either cost. The court held, therefore, that
the statute explicitly made the fund liable for medical benefits
after the first 104 weeks. 7 With the similarities existing between
South Carolina's statute and New York's, the judicial interpretation should be analogous, thereby implementing the legislative
policy of encouraging employers to hire the handicapped.
C. Administration and Financing of the Second Injury Fund
The South Carolina Second Injury Fund was originally established under the office of the State Treasurer with administrative duties falling upon the shoulders of the Industrial Commission.77 The Fund is now established as a separate state agency,
73. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72.601(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975).

74. N.Y. WORKMEN'S CoMP. LAW § 15(8)(d) (McKinney 1965).
75. 307 N.Y. 592, 123 N.E.2d 83 (1954). But see Bruner v. Commonwealth, 459
S.W.2d 138 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Federal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 371 S.W.2d 955 (Mo.
Sup. Ct. 1963).
76. The South Carolina statute permits an employer to recoup 50 percent of medical
expenses paid in excess of $3000 during the first 78 weeks following the injury and then
additional reimbursement for all medical expenses payable subsequent to the first 78
weeks following the injury. The employer must show, however, that his liability for medical benefits is substantially greater because of the combined effects of the preexisting
impairment and subsequent injury or by reason of the aggravation of the preexisting
impairment, than would have resulted solely from the subsequent injury. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 72-601(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
77. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-602(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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much like the Workmen's Compensation Fund,"8 administered by
a director, with the actual monies and securities being placed in
trust with the State Treasurer. 9
Noting the broad coverage provisions enacted by the Legislature and discussed above, it is obvious that the objectives of the
Fund can never be realized without a strong, self-perpetuating
financial base. While several methods of financing are available,
the first impulse is to seek endowment from the State, and there
are some viable arguments supporting such a proposition. South
Carolina has approximately 168,000 persons between the ages of
16 and 64 years old that are afflicted with some form of work
disability." Unemployment among this group is high, which often
results in their becoming public charges on the welfare rolls. Any
expenditure which encourages the employment of such people
would direct the taxpayer's dollar towards relieving the State of
a major financial burden. Instead of pumping time and resources
merely into keeping these people alive, tax revenue would be used
to encourage employment, enabling the handicapped to be selfsupporting citizens contributing to the economic growth of the
State. The potential benefits to the State are substantial and its
contribution should reflect this potential."1 South Carolina's contribution to the financing of its Second Injury Fund was composed of a three-stage juggling act.8 2 The Legislature authorized:

(1) the transfer of $100,000 from the Workmen's Compensation
Fund to the Second Injury Fund; (2) the deposit of one-third of
the Workmen's Compensation Premium Tax into the Fund; 3 and
(3) the deposit of commuted death compensation into the Fund.8 4
78. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-451 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
79. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-602(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975).

80. S.C. SECOND INJURY FuND & S.C. VOCATIONAL REHABIUTIAT1ON DEPr, THE SOUTH
CAROLINA SECOND INJURY FUND, WHAT IT MEANS (1973).
81. For a discussion of potential benefits see Fabing & Barrow, Encouragement of
Employment of the Handicapped-Extensionof Second Injury FundPrinciplesto Persons
Having Latent Impairments,8 VAND. L. REv. 575, 585 (1955) [hereinafter Fabing & Barrow]. The article also suggests that a preexisting handicap which is not a result of an
industrial accident is not a product of industry and the cost of overcoming the handicap
should therefore not be borne by it.
82. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-602(c) (Cum. Supp. 1975).

83. See S.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 72-414 (1962). This provision requires that "[e]very insur-

ance carrier insuring employers in this State.

.

.shall.

. .

pay a tax upon the premiums

received. ..at a rate of four and one half percent of the amount of such premiums ....
84. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-165(c) & (d)(Cum. Supp. 1975). These provisions direct
that if a deceased employee leaves no dependents (or only partial dependents under § 72162) and. no mother or father, certain commuted compensation paid by the employer,
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These contributions were limited to the first year, however, and
no further provisions were made for contributions by the State.
The heart of Second Injury Fund financing is the "continuing
basis" provision"5 which calls for "equitable assessments" upon
each insurance carrier." This reliance on assessment upon industry within the state is similar to the New York system,"7 taking
into account three factors: (1) replenishment; (2) growth; and (3)
fair share risk-spreading. The assessment formula 8 calls for full
replenishment of the Fund each year with a 75 percent increase
in assets to be assessed on a pro rata basis reflecting each carrier's
benefit from the Fund.
beyond expenses for burial and administration of the deceased's estate, will be paid into
the Second Injury Fund.
South Carolina's original Second Injury Fund was financed primarily from this source
creating a financially inadequate and unutilized fund. This source of financing was severely limited by the fact that less than one percent of all job connected injuries result in
death, and an even smaller percentage of the resulting death payments accrued to the
Fund. See L. LARSON, supra note 12, at 7.
85. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-602(d) (Cum. Supp. 1975).

86. Id. The term "carrier" includes insurance carriers, self-insurers and the State
Workmen's Compensation Fund. Id.
87. N.Y. WORKMEN'S Comp. LAW § 15(8)(h) (McKinney 1965).
88. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-602(d) (Cum. Supp. 1975). The provision calls for an

assessment on each insurer based on the'following formula:
Assessment = [(1.75 x TD) - NA] BC

BI
where TD = Total disbursements from Fund during previous fiscal year
NA = Net assets in Fund at end of fiscal year
BC = Total benefits paid by individual carrier during preceding
fiscal year ending June 30
BI = Total benefits paid by all carriers during preceding
fiscal year ending December 31
Example:

Total Disbursements
Growth & Replenishment factor

=

$50,000
1.75

TOTAL NEEDED

=

$87,500.

Net Assets

=

TOTAL TO BE COLLECTED

=

-10,000
$77,500.

Benefits paid by Carrier X = 500,000

Benefits paid by all carriers = 20,000,000

Assessment for Carrier X

=

77,500 x

1

~-
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The New York prorated assessment method has provided
that state with a sound financial base for its Subsequent Injury
Fund and should provide adequate and continuing financial resources. As a result, administrators need not be concerned about
the possible insolvency of the Fund, thereby permitting them to
encourage claims against it. 9 Furthermore, the limits upon the
amount the Fund will be allowed to accumulate will prevent unnecessary burdens on those who support it. This crucial requirement of adequate financing, along with the broad coverage provisions of South Carolina's Fund, hopefully will diminish employers' fear of increased compensation costs when they hire the
handicapped.
IV.

PROBLEM AREAS

A. Statute of Limitations
One major problem with South Carolina's Fund is the fact
that in order for an employer or carrier to come within the terms
of the Fund he must notify the Industrial Commission and Director of the Second Injury Fund of any possible claim within 78
weeks of the injury,"0 while the injured workman is permitted 2
years to file a claim with the employer." This double standard
puts the employer in jeopardy of full liability for any unknown
claims which may be brought against him after the employer's 78week period of limitation has expired. For example, if an injured
workman files a claim against his employer 100 weeks after the
date of injury, the employer is automatically prevented from
seeking Second Injury Fund coverage. This problem appears to
be a legislative oversight and should be quickly rectified by extending to 2 years the time in which the employer must file notice
of a possible claim under the Fund.
B. Employer Attitudes
An even greater problem involved in implementing the objectives of the Second Injury Fund is the removal of employers'
economic fears and prejudices against hiring the handicapped.
Although their liability is limited by the Fund, many employers
believe that handicapped workers tend to be accident prone and
89. L. LARsON, supra note 12, at 7.
90. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-601(f) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
91. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-303 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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less productive than unimpaired workers.
The United States Department of Labor conducted a study
comparing 11,000 impaired workers with 18,000 unimpaired
workers, and concluded that there is no significant difference
92
with respect to accident frequency or level of performance.
When the handicapped worker is properly placed, the physical
impairment does not affect unfavorably the quantity or quality
of performance.93 A commentary on this study stated that the
reason why the performance and accident experience of handicapped workers compared so favorably with that of unimpaired
workers is that, in the competition for jobs, the impaired worker
realizes his infirmity will be regarded as a handicap, so he compensates with hard work, regular attendance and precaution
against accidents.9 4 Furthermore, the impaired individual realizes the need for conserving his remaining ability, and if there is
any additional tendency to have accidents, it is overridden by the
special care the handicapped exercise in their work.95
Another common excuse expressed by employers is that the
hiring of handicapped workers will increase their compensation
costs."0 The mere employment of the handicapped, however, can
never cause an increase in costs, for the workmen's compensation
costs of an employer are determined by the relative hazards inherent in the type of business he conducts, along with the accident experience of the particular employer. It is only when the
handicapped worker has more accidents than the unimpaired
worker that the employers' premiums increase, a result proven to
be unlikely.
92. Fabing & Barrow, supra note 81, at 577, citing U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR BULL. No.
122, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND
REHABILITATION 19 (1950).
93. Fabing & Barrow, supra note 81, at 577.
94. Id. at 578.
95. Id.
96. See L. LARSON, supra note 12, at 16, citing U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS,
DEPT. OF LABOR BULL. No. 234, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND THE PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED WORKER (1961).
97. See Fabing & Barrow, supra note 81, at 579. See also L. LARSON, supra note 12,
at 1, who states:
[Tihe possibility of a direct increase in workmen's compensation costs exists
only for those employers who are subject to experience rating. It has been
estimated that about 80 percent of all employers in this country do not qualify
for experience rating. Their rates are based on the experience of all employers
in their class. They therefore need have no fear that their compensation costs
would rise as a direct consequence of their employing handicapped workers or
if the handicapped workers in their employment become further disabled.
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To overcome employers' economic fears and prejudices, administrators of the Second Injury Fund must strive to inform
employers about the actual operations of the Fund, and educate
them about the stability of the handicapped worker. It is essential
to obtain the full cooperation of private industry, for without it
the purposes of a Fund will never be achieved.
V.

CONCLUSION

Employment of the handicapped is of essential economic and
social importance to every individual in South Carolina. The
public will benefit, for one who might have been a public charge
will now be a self-supporting, tax-paying citizen. Industry will
profit since the size of its labor force will increase. But most
importantly, the handicapped individual will be better able to
support himself and his family. The General Assembly has created one of the most liberal and comprehensive subsequent injury funds in the country; it is now up to the public to apply it
and remove the stigma from the handicapped worker.
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